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CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH AND
SEIZURE - CONCEALED WEAPONS.-
[Illinois] The defendant, a notori-
ous police character, was arrested
by police officers without a warrant
or any reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that he had committed a
criminal offense. A search of his
person disclosed a revolver con-
cealed thereon. Prior to his trial
upon an indictment for carrying
concealed weapons, the defendant
petitioned to suppress the evidence
as having been obtained in the
course of an unlawful arrest and
search prohibited by the Illinois
Constitution, Section 6- of Article
2. This petition was denied and on
an appeal it was held: That the
denial of the petition was in error
and the evidence was inadmissible:
People v. McGurn (1931) 341 Ill.
632; 173 N. E. 754.
Under the common law con-
stables and watchmen were author-
ized to make arrest without war-
rants of felons and persons reason-
ably suspected of being felons and
in cases of misdemeanors committed
in the presence of officers: North
v. People (1891) 139 Ill. 81; 28 N.
E. 966; Kindred v. Stitt (1869) 51
Ill. 49. Policemen were unknown
at the common law but they gen-
erally have been considered as hav-
ing the same powers as watchmen
and constables: Shanley v. Wells
(1873) 71 Ill. 78.
In Illinois an arrest may be made
by an officer or private person with-
out a warrant for a criminal of-
fense committed or attempted in his
presence, and by an officer when a
criminal offense has in fact been
committed and he has reasonable
grounds for believing that the per-
son to be arrested has committed it:
Smith-Hurd Ill. Statutes (1929)
Chapter 38, Sect. 657, Page 1056.
People v. Swift (1926) 319 Ill. 359;
150 N. E. 663. It has also been
held that the police cannot arrest
only for questioning: People v.
Scalisi (1926) 324 Ill. 131. None
of the above grounds for arrest ap-
peared in the instant case.
The question to be determined
then, is whether evidence of crim-
inality by an act of trespass is to
be rejected as incompetent for the
misconduct of the trespasser. The
question is not a new one. The
English Courts and the majority of
the State Courts in the U. S. are
not in accord with the holding of
the principal case, but hold that evi-
dence illegally obtained by unlawful
search and seizure, if competent
otherwise, is admissible: Bishop At-
terbury's Trial (1723-) 16 How St.
Trials 495; Phelps v. Prew (1854)
3 E and B 430; Rex v. Doyle
N. F. Baker MInier Sargent
(1886) 12 Ont. 350; Adams v. New
York (1904) 192 U. S. 585; Hart-
man v. U. S. (1909) 168 Fed. -30;
Cornelson v. State (1922) 18 Ala.
App. 639; 94 So. 202; Robertson v.
Montgomery (1917) 246 S. W. 860;
Venable v. State (1923) 246 S. W.
860; People v. LeDoux (1909) 155
Cal. 535; 102 P. 517; State v. Man-
gans (1922) 97 Conn. 543; 117 A.
550; Johnson v. State (1921) 152
Ga. 271; 109 S. E. 662; Gindrat v.
People (1891) 138 Ill. 103; 27 N. E.
1085; People v. Paisley (1919) 288
Ill. 310; 123 N. E. 573; Comm. v.
Dana (1841) 2 Met. 329; 43 Mass.
329; Comm. v. Donelly (1923) 141
N. E. 500; People v. Defore (1926)
242 N. Y. 13; 150 N. E. 585; People
v. Boren (1923) 190 N. Y. Supp.
306; State v. Simons (1922) 183
N. C. 684; 110 S. E. 591; State v.
Royce (1905) 38 Wash. 111, 80 P.
268.
There is, however, a strong min-
ority which is at variance with the
above rule. This group is led by
the U. S. Supreme'Court with which
the instant case accords. It appears
that this minority is a growing group
and exercises a great influence upon
all the courts. Formerly the U. S.
Supreme Court followed the Ortho-
dox rule but in 1885 it changed its
position in the case of Boyd v. U. S.
116 U. S. 616. Then it reverted
again in the case of Adams v. N. Y.
(1904) 192 U. S. 585. In 1914,
however, in Weeks v. U. S., 232
U. S. 383, the Supreme Court re-
versed itself and has since then been
a member of the minority group.
The following cases illustrate the
minority rule: Silverthorne Lum-
ber Co. v. U. S. (1919) 251 U. S.
385; Atz. v. Andrews (1922) 84 Fla.
43; 94 S. 329; People v. Montgares
(1929) 336 IIl. 458; 168 N. E. 304;
People v. Elias (1925) 316 Ill. 376;
147 N. E. 472; People v. Reid
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(1925) 315 Ill. 597; 146 N. E. 504;
People v. Prall (1924) 314 Ill. 518;
145 N. E. 610; People v. Castree
(1924) 311 Ill. 392; 143 N. E. 112;
People v. Brocamp (1923) 307 Ill.
448; 138 N. E. 728; Flum v. State
(1923) 193 Ind. 585; 141 N. E. 353;
Banks v. Comm. (1924) 202 Ky.
702; People v. Thompson (1923)
221 Mich. 618; 192 N. W. 560;
Taylor v. State (1922) 129 Miss.
815; 93 So. 355; State v. Owens
(1924) 302 Mo. 340; Cravens v.
State (1924) 148 Tenn. 517; State
v. Massie (1923) 95 W. Va. 233;
120 S. E. 514; Hoyer v. State
(1923) 180 Wis. 407; 193 N. W.
89; State v. Jokosh (1923) 181 Wis.
160, 193 N. W. 976.
It is the contention of the minor-
ity rule that the admission of such
evidence is a violation of the 4th
amendment to the U. S. Constitu-
tion and various provisions of sim-
ilar character found in every state
Constitution and particularly present
in the pending case under discussion.
Historically, however, the 4th
amendment does not contain the
double immunity contended for it.
It makes unlawful search and seiz-
ure without warrant, but it does not
contain a provision that evidence
so obtained in the course of an il-
legal act shall not be admissible. See
19 Ill. Law Review 303 (1924);
American Bar Association Journal,
Aug. 1922, page 479.
The difference of holdings pre-
sents a problem in legal philosophy.
It has been stated in the following
manner, "The question is whether
protection for the individual would
not be gained at a disproportionate
loss of protection for society. On
one side is the social need that
crime be repressed; on the other,
the social need that law shall not
be flouted by insolency of office:
Cardozo, J., People v. Defore (1926)
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242 N. Y. 13; at page 24. It ap-
pears that the Court in the principal
case was influenced by the Federal
rulings based on the expression that
"the end does not justify the means"
and that there is more to be feared
from official illegality than from
private violations of the law.
It is submitted, however, that the
very nature of the offense of carry-
ing concealed weapons was such
that it could not be perceived.
Hence the situation was one de-
manding arrest on suspicion alone,
and the notorious character of the
defendant might be sufficient founda-
tion for the suspicion.
HYMAN B. LEvIN.
SENTENCE- POWER OF COURT TO
SHORTEN AFTER COMMITMENT.-
[Federal] In a criminal prosecu-
tion by the United States the de-
fendant and others were sentenced
to the county jail for the period of
one year. But after defendants had
served three months, probation was
to be granted "on condition that they
abide by the laws." Having served
three months and after the expira-
tion of the term of court in which
sentence was imposed, 6ach defend-
ant petitioned to show cause why
writ of habeas corpus should not
issue. Held: "The remedy of de-
fendants is by parole or pardon.
Writq denied": United States v.
Praxulis (Wash. N. D. 1931) 49
Fed. (2) 774.
In the absence of statute a court
cannot set aside or alter its judg-
ment after the expiration of the
term: Ex Parte Friday (N. D. N.
Y. 1890) 43 Fed 916; Corn. v. Fos-
ter (1877) 122 Mass. 317, 23 Am.
Re'p. 326, 2 Am. Crim. Rep. 499;
Woodcock v. Richey (1928) 225 Ky.
318, 8 S. W. (2) 389 (court has no
power in subsequent .term to sus-
pend further execution of the sen-
tence because of defendant's ill
health). A trial court at the same
term has no power to set aside a
sentence after defendant has been
committed and impose a different
sentence increasing the punishment:
Ex Parte Lange (1874) 18 Wall.
163, 21 L. Ed. 872; Re Johnson (C.
C. Mass. 1891) 46 Fed. 477; Hick-
man v. Fenton (1930) 120 Neb. 66,
231 N. W. 510, 70 A. L. R. 819;
Wharton "Criminal Procedure"
(10th ed. 1918) see. 1853. But cf.
State v. Ludderth (1922) 184 N. C.
753, 114 S. E. 828 (trial court in-
creased punishment because defend-
ant appealed); State v. Dougherty
(1886) 70 Ia. 439, 30 N. W. 685
(increased fine prior to satisfaction
of judgment); Regina v. Fitzgerald
(1795) 1 Salk. 401. However, in
the same term, the court may reduce
the punishment after commitment:
Re Graves (D. C. 1902) 117 Fed.
798 (relied upon in United States
v. Benz, post); State v. O'Connor
(1922) 154 Minn. 45, 191 N. W. 50.
Contra: Emerson v. Boyles (1926)
170 Ark. 621, 280 S. W. 1005, 44 A.
L. R. 1193.
The exercise of this power in its
more simple forms is clear but dif-
ficulties arise when the power as-
sumes executive color. Although
the separation of powers doctrine is
a recognized governmental theory
the independence of these powers is
qualified: Ex Parte Grossman
(1925) 267 U. S. 87, 45 S. Ct. 332.
In a later opinion Chief Justice Taft
said, "The beginning of the service
of the sentence in a criminal case
ends the power of the court even in
the same term to change it":
United States v. Murray (1928) 275
U. S. 347 at 358, 48 S. Ct. 146
(denying the power to federal courts
of first instance to grant probation
under the Probation Act after de-
fendant has served any part of his
sentence). During the last term of
the Supreme Court Mr. Justice
Sutherland speaking for an unani-
mous court was forced to interpret
the quoted statement of Chief Jus-
tice Taft: United States v. Benz
(1931) 282 U. S. 304, 51 S. Ct. 113,
75 L. Ed. 192; Comment (1931) 19
Geo. L. J. 365. Benz, while serving
a ten months sentence and before the
expiration of the term, petitioned
the federal District Court to modify
the sentence. The court reduced the
term of imprisonment from ten to
six months. To explain its affirm-
ance the Supreme Court pointed out
that the words in United States v.
Murray were only illustrative of
congressional intent and further the
case involved the construction of
the Probation Act of 1925 (18 U. S.
C. A. secs. 724-727), and not the
general powers of the court: United
States v. Benz 51 S. Ct. at 115, 75
L. Ed. at. 194. Ten days after the
Benz Cae the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Second'Circuit, relying on the
Benz Case affirmed the power of the
District Court to sentence a defend-
ant to a year and a day after "serv-
ing" four months of a two year pro-
bation: United States v. Grossberg
(C. C. A. 2nd 1931) 47 Fed. (2)
597; cf. Reeves v. United States (C.
C. A. 8th 1929) 35 Fed. (2) 323
(defendant sentenced to jail at ex-
piration of probation term and after
court term though he had not vio-
lated probation orders).
The principal case would seem to
indicate certain limitations upon the
court's generat power over judg-
ments. (1) The court's power is
definitely limited to the term, and
judgments in the term may not so
be designed as to have future effect
when that power does not exist.
(2) The scope of the Parole Act
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(1910 and 1913) (18 U. S. C. A.
secs. 714-723), the Probation Act,
supra, the court's general powers,
and the pardoning power are de-
limited. If the behavior of the de-
fendant warrants he may be parolea
after one-third of the sentence is
served: 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 714.
This is in the province of the Parole
Boards and not of the courts. The
Probation Act may be invoked after
conviction: 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 724.
The court may revoke or modify
any probation within five years:
United States v. Murray, supra. But
after conviction the court under the
Probation Act is limited to suspend-
ing "imposition or execution of sen-
tence": 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 724.
The judgment in the instant case
directed execution of sentence to be
later arrested with the granting of
probation. This was beyond the
province of the Probation Act and
was not within the court's general
powers as defined by United States
v. Benz. The Parole Boards (18
U. S. C. A. secs. 715-716) or the
Chief Executive alone have power
to grant such relief: Article 2, sec.
2, cl. 1, Constitution. A judgment
with like effect but different form
has been found to be void: White
v. Burke (C. C. A. 10th 1930) 43
Fed. (2) 329 (district court without
power to impose probatioi with con-
dition that defendant serve some
portion of a sentence of imprison-
ment). The purpose of this decision
was likewise to avoid overlapping
of the Parole Act and clashes be-
tween the orders of District Courts
and of Parole Boards. The Proba-
tion Act gave no power to the trial
court to vacate its judgment after
the expiration of the term and prior
to execution of sentence by remis-
sion of the fine: United States v.
Felder (S. D. N. Y. 1926) 13 Fed.
(2) 527. Prior to Ex Parte United
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States [(1916) 242 U. S. 27, 37 S.
Ct. 1] the District Courts exercised
their various forms of probation but
that case denied the power and de-
manded Congressional authority.
These six years under the Probation
Act (1925) have necessitated much
construction.
The principal case is of additional
interest since the power of a court
to sentence for a definite period of
imprisonment with the provision
that after a partial service proba-
tion be granted was earlier denied
upon the ground that any interfer-
ence by a judge with a closed sen-
tence after the prisoner had entered
the penitentiary should not be at-
tempted since it was not unlike the
exercise of the pardoning power:
Archer v. Snook (N. D. Ga. 1926)
10 Fed. (2) 567. But United States
v. Benz definitely disapproved any
such reasoning: 51 S. Ct. at 115,
75 L. Ed.. at 194. See Hynes v.
United States (C. C. A. 7th 1929)
35 Fed. (2) 734 and Cisson v.
United States (C. C. A. 4th 1930)
37 Fed. (2) 330 (which are nor
mentioned by the court but are in
Government's brief, and so infer-
entially overruled). In the Benz
Case the petition for the reduction
of the sentence was made during the
term of court so that the judge in
the principal case could approve the
theory of that case yet reach the
same conclusion as -in Archer v.
Snook by pointing out that a court
couldn't do by reservation what it
later would have no power to do.
The trial courts in the same term
may either before or after commit-
ment reduce the punishment of ini-
tial judgments. But, even though the
courts have exclusive power to grant
probation their judgments must not
have the effect of usurping the juris-
diction of the Parole Boards by sen-
tencing to both the penitentiary and
subsequent probation. It is vital to
know the boundaries of the courts'






was seated in a passenger train in
Cook County when officers charged
with the enforcement of the game
laws boarded the train in search of
persons whom they had been told
were guilty of violating those laws.
These officers saw some feathers
sticking out of the defendant's
pocket, searched his person for evi-
dence of guilt, and found four hen
pheasants in his coat pockets. The
officers had no search warrant or
warrant, for arrest. They removed
the defendant's coat forcibly, and,
according to his testimony, against
his will. One officer alone, Schultz,
testified that the defendant did not
protest. The officers arrested him and
proceeded to have him prosecuted
for the unlawful possession of hen
pheasants at a time when the killing
or possession of a hen pheasant was
a criminal offense under the provi-
sions of the Game Code of the State
of Illinois. The defendant was con-
victed in a justice court. An ap-
peal to the Criminal Court was de-
cided against the defendant. A peti-
tion to the same tribunal asking the
suppression of the evidence as il-
legally obtained was similarly dis-
posed of. The defendant appealed.
Held:' on appeal, reversed. The
search of the defendant, without a
warrant and before arrest, by of-
ficers merely having anonymous
telephonic information that there
had been a violation of the game
laws and that the violator was on a
certain train, those officers merely
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observing feathers in the defend-
ant's pocket, was unlawful, because
such circumstances are not probable
cause for arrest and because the
search was made before arrest. Ad-
missions made and evidence discov-
ered at the time of such unlawful
search should be suppressed: Peo-
ple v. De Luca (April, 1931) 175
N. E. 370.
The issues raised in this case, as
shown by the briefs of counsel, were
three in number: (1) Whether
the mere possession of a hen pheas-
ant was an offense included in the
Game Code; (2) whether there was
probable cause for making the ar-
rest before the search, assuming
that there was an arrest, which was
denied; (3) whether the search was
illegal as being before arrest and
without a search warrant, the re-
sultant evidence being illegally ob-
tained.
The court in its opinion apparently
assumed that the first issue was not
worthy of comment for, with no dis-
cussion whatsoever, it said that the
defendant "was convicted of the of-
fense of unlawfully possessing a
hen pheasant at a time when the
killing or possession of a hen pheas-
ant was a criminal offense of the
game laws of Illinois," p. 370-1.
Such treatment of this issue cannot
be commended. The court, in the
interest of clarity, if nothing else,
should have decided finally and de-
cisively upon the point raised.
The court decided that there was
no probable cause before the search
for an arrest and hence, in effect,
decided that the arrest, if it oc-
curred before search, was illegal,
and the evidence thereby obtained
should be suppressed. The court
also decided that the search occurred'
before the arrest, thus rendering the
evidence obtained objectionable in
either alternative.
It is believed that the court's con-
clusion is a sound one. But. the
opinion is misleading to anyone hav-
ing no knowledge of the contents
of the briefs of counsel, for the de-
cision on one issue was assumed and
the language of the decisions on the
other two issues was such as to make
it practically impossible to discover
the true holding. It would be dif-
ficult to cite the case with any de-
gree of certainty for any one point
with the assurance that it would be
accepted as an authority for that
point. It would be better, it is be-
lieved, to decide such a case on one
point alone-specifically leaving the
other to be decided later.
The decision in the principal case
has aroused much controversy be-
cause of two prevailing views as to
the function of the law. Here
again, loose constructionists and
strict constructionists differ rad-
ically in their interpretations. These
are: (1) A belief that the corpus
of the law is merely a means to an
end and if the "means" defeats the
purpose for which it was created it
should bd disregarded. The par-
ticular application here is that if
the suppressed evidence clearly
showed the defendant to be guilty
he should have been held, regardless
of the technicality of search before
arrest. (2) Those holding the sec-
ond view believe, in general, that
even though occasionally a guilty
defendant might be set free in the
process, the integrity of our laws
should be maintained until they are
changed in a proper manner. In
particular, they believe that this de-
fendant should have been set free
if no other evidence than that which
was suppressed could be advanced,
for the reason that the law, in this
case, was obviously violated to se-
cure the defendant's conviction.
Undoubtedly, the loose construc-
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tionist's view has much to be said
for it. The body of the law, and
its procedure, in general, should not
be deified and set up as a fetish to
be worshipped to the extent that the
guilty escape punishment for their
offenses or to the extent that Officers
of the law are hindered in their
work. Without a doubt the law is
only a means to an end. It is be-
lieved, however, that when a certain
procedure has developed because of
some essential need to combat the
very human tendency toward oppres-
sion, such procedure should not be
casually disregarded when it is
shown that an accused person actu-
ally is guilty though not declared so
legally. An accused person is not
legally guilty until declared so by a
court of law and until then he is
entitled to all the safeguards due to
an innocent man.
Search warrants appear to have
been unknown to the early common
law. The practice of using them
grew imperceptibly and they were at
first confined to searches for stolen
goods: see State v. $ustice's Court
(1912) 45 Mont. 375, 382, 123 Pac.
405. But their usefulness soon
forced their recognition as well as
led to their abuse, for a practice
gradually crept into the administra-
tion of the English government for
the secretary of state to issue gen-
eral warrants for searching private
houses to discover and seize books
and papers that might be used to
convict their owners of charges of
libel. Their use was extended until
the person, property, and premises
of the individual were subject, prac-
tically without limit, to search and
seizure, which became so oppressive
and intolerable that the courts and
Parliament were finally forced to
restrict and control their use: En-
tick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How.
St. Tr. 1029. Consequently, in 1766
the House of Commons passed reso-
lutions condemning general war-
rants for the seizure of persons or
their books and papers: Parlia-
mentary History (1766) Vol. XVI,
p. 209; Constitutional History of
England, T. E. May (Am. ed.,
1864), Vol. 2, Ch. XI, pp. 245-252.
When the people of this country
founded the various states and the
nation, sooner or lafer they pro-
vided in the constitutions thereof
that the people should be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search
and seizure: Boyd v. United States
(1885) 116 U. S. 616, 625; Buckley
v. Beaulieu (1908) 104 Me. 56, 71
Atl. 70; State v. Anderson (1917)
270 Mo. 533, 194 S. W. 268; Ex
parte Gould (1910) 60 Tex. Crim.
442, 447, 132 S. W. 364. The secur-
ity intended to be guaranteed by the
provisions against wrongful search
and seizure is designed to prevent
violations of private security in per-
son and property and unlawful in-
vasion of the sanctity of the home
of the citizen by officers of the law
and to give a remedy against such
usurpations when attempted: Adams
v. New York (1904) 192 U. S. 585.
24 S. Ct. 372; State v. Mausert
(1915) 88 N. J. L. 286, 95 Atl. 991.
Federal and state constitutions pro-
vide against unreasonable searches
and seizures. In addition, statutes
of the State of Illinois provide that
in offenses against the game laws a
search warrant is necessary to
search the person of an accused:
Cahill's Ill. R. St., 1931, Ch. 61,
secs. 55-58.
The court in the principal case
held that there was no probable
cause for an arrest under the exist-
ing circumstances. It is believed
that this finding is correct. The fact
that the defendant really was guilty
has no bearing whatsoever in de-
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termining this point. It is a ques-
tion of fact, and it is conceded that
reasonable men may disagree on
such a finding. But here the ques-
tion was decided favorably to the
defendant. It may be argued by the
loose constructionists that the fact
that the prisoner was guilty should
have swayed the court to decide that
there was probable cause for the ar-
rest, but to urge such a thing would
be to undermine that judicial im-
partiality that we have been at such
pains to cultivate and which we have
been so distressed to find wanting in
certain cases. It would be a peculiar
paradox to allow officers of the law
to violate the law in order to en-
force it. The general public would
have no security at all as a result of
such tactics. Overzealousness to
enforce the law plus an over-tolerant
attitude toward their violations o2
the law in so doing soon would lead
officers to rashness and carelessness




Albert Fall, Secretary of the In-
terior, was being prosecuted for
bribery. Seventy years of age at the
time of the trial, and in dangerously
poor health, he was brought into
court in a wheel chair, heavily
wrapped in blankets. This, coupled
with an ostensibly illustrious public
career, was brought to the attention
of the jury in a forcefully dramatic
fashion. Counsel for the defense, in
closing, assured the jury that Fall
needed the "lung-healing sunshine of
New Mexico," and asserted that if
he were sent to prison as a result
of this "political persecution" he
would die. In conclusion, the jury
were told that no one could hold
them to account for any verdict they
might return. In his charge, the
trial judge instructed the jury that
it had nothing to do with the "lung-
healing sunshine of New Mexico";
that they were to decide the case
upon the evidence and nothing else.
In touching upon the last remarks
of the defense, the court warned the
jury that the lawful way for it
to express sympathy for the defend-
ant was not by an unjustifiable
verdict, but by recommending clem-
ency. The jury, in doing this, were
to bear in mind, however, that such
a recommendation became no part
of the verdict, nor was it binding
upon the court, although it would
become a part of the record. The
defendant reserved exceptions to
the above given portions of the
charge. Held: that there was no
error in the charge, because the
summation arguments of counsel
were so extraneous to the evidence
and so obviously an appeal to preju-
dice and sympathy that a cautionary
instruction such as the one involved
was proper: Fall v. United States
(C. C. A. D. C., 1931) 49 Fed. (2d)
506.
There were two contentions to be
disposed of by the court. The first,
briefly discussed, involved that por-
tion of the charge which discussed
clemency. An instruction that inti-
mates a probability of clemency, if
the jury recommends it, has been
held to be prejudicially erroneous:
see Crawford v. State (1821) 2 Yerg.
60, 24 Am. Dec. 467; 0sius v.
State (1928) 96 Fla. 318, 117 So.
859. An intimation that the-court
would be lenient if evidence upon
the question of motive, taken after
the verdict, warranted it, consti-
tuted reversible error: Miller v.
United States (1911) 27 App. D. C.
138. The same result is reached, and
the same reasoning employed, when
the jury itself inquires about the re-
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sult of a recommendation of clem-
ency after it has retired: McBean
v. State (1892) 83 Wis. 206, 53 N.
W. 497; State v. Keefer (1902) 16
S. D. 180, 91 N. W. 1117; Territory
v. Griego (1895) 8 N. M. 133, 42
P. 81. But cf. Rehfeld v. State
(1921) 102 Ohio St. 6131, 131 N.
E. 712. This discussion assumes, of
course, that there are no statutory
provisions for mandatory recom-
mendations of clemency and for in-
structions to that effect: See Note,
17 A. L. R. 1117.
In all the cases, the criterion used
by the courts to reach a decision was
the factor of "inducement." This
was clearly demonstrated in the fed-
eral case cited: Miller v. United
States, mpra. The central idea is
that there must be no verdict that
is induced by matters extraneous to
the evidence (such as an intima-
tion of probable clemency). With
this criterion in mind, it becomes
apparent that the decision in the
principal case on this portion of the
charge is correct. There could have
been no inducement in a charge
warning the jury that its recom-
mendation would have no binding
effect upon the court. The charge
merely cautioned the jury as to its
power and duty, and impressed upon
it the wrongfulness of transforming
a desire for clemency into an un-
justifiable and unreasonable verdict.
The second problem to be disposed
of by the court involved the matter
of cautionary instructions in gen-
eral, and the nature of this particu-
lar instruction. The authorities
establish the uncontroverted rule
that it is part of the defendant's
right to counsel that he have the
benefit of his proper summation
argument, and that any instruction
to disregard such argument is re-
versible error: Bishop "New Crim-
inal Procedure" (2d ed., 1913) sec.
975a; People v. Ainbach (1910) 247
Ill. 451, 93 .N. E. 310; Common-
wealth v. Maddocks (1910) 207
Mass. 152, 93 N. E. 25; State v.
Silverman (1924) 100 N. J. Law
249, 126 A. 618. Cf. U. S. v. Flow-
ery (D. C. D. Mass., 1845) 25 Fed.
1124, 1 Spr. 109, Fed. Cas. 15122;
State v. Rugero (1906) 117 La.
1040, 42 So. 495; People v. De Camp
(1906) 146 Mich. 533, 109 N. W.
1047. "It is both the right and duty
of counsel to maintain their cause";
and their statements of the facts
need not be in soft terms: State v.
Price (1916) 135 Minn. 159, 160
N. W. 677; Bishop, supra.
When the summation is based
upon the evidence, the court cannot
prevent illogical or unsound conclu-
sions from being drawn, if coun-
sel stay within the proper limits of
debate; and this is so even of the
argument be most forceful and con-
tain invective: Bishop, supra; Com-
ment (1926) 4 N. C. L. Rev. 132;
United States v. Flowery, supra;
Patterson v. State (1905) 122 Ga.
587, 50 S. E. 489; State v. Rugero,
supra; People v. DeCamp, supra.
The right to counsel and to the
argument of counsel in summation,
however, does not justify an unre-
strained forensic meandering. The
summation, whether it be that of
the prosecution or of the defense
(there is apparently no difference
in the handling of cases wherein the
prosecution is at fault and those
wherein the defense is at fault),
must follow the evidence and con-
stitute a reasonable deduction there-
from: Burton v. Commonwealth
(1913) 151 Ky. 587, 152 S. W. 545;
State v. Guerringer (1915) 265 Mo.
408, 178 S. W. 65; State v. Neadeau
(1921) 137 Wash. 297, 242 P. 36;
Washington v. State (1920) 25 Ga.
Apps. 422, 103 S. E. 854; State v.
Silverman, supra. Cf. People v.
Dana (1886) 59 Mich. 550, 26 N.
W. 780, 781.
Charges similar to the one in the
principal case are usually found in
cases in which the summation argu-
ment of counsel, instead of merely
misinterpreting facts or attempting
to get in new evidence, simply ap-
peals to the passion, prejudice, or
sympathy of the jury; charges
against such argument are uniformly
upheld: People v. Dana, supra;
State v. Fogleman (1913) 161 N. C.
458, 79 S. E. 879; People v. Duzan
(1916) 272 Ill. 478, 112 N. E. 854;
State v. Silverman, supra; State v.
Harsted (1911) 66 Wash. 158, 119
P. 24; State v. Stockton (1925) 119
Kan. 868, 241 P. 688; State v. Sev-
erin (1929) 58 N. D. 792, 228 N. W.
199. Cf. State v. Butts (1899) 107
Ia. 65, 78 N. W. 687; State v. Guer-
ringer, supra; Commonwealth v. Nye
(1913) 340 Pa. 354, 87 A. 585; State
v. Hamilton (1916) 80 Or. 562, 157
P. 796; State v. Farrell (1928) 320
Mo. 319, 6 S. W. (2d) 875; Wolfe
v. State (1928) 200 Ind. 557, 159
N. E. 545; Commonwealth v. Crow
(1931) 303 Pa. 91, 154 A. 283.
It has been suggested that where
the actions of the counsel and the
spectators in the court room are
such as to create passion, prejudice,
or sympathy, cautionary instructions
not only are permissible, but are
necessary, and should be given:
Brewer v. State (1909) 160 Ala. 66,
49 So. 336. Cf. Cobb v. Covenant
Mutual Benefit Assn. (1891) 153
Mass. 176, 26 N. E. 230; State v.
Hamilton, supra; State v. Barton
(1911) 70 Or. 470, 142 P. 248.
The authorities support the con-
clusion of the court in the principal
case as to the portions of the charge
which have been discussed. The
support can be claimed both by an
analogy of fact situations, and by
an application of the reasoning of
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the cases cited. There is no doubt
that a forceful dramatization of the
past record, the dangerous physical
condition, and the fine personal ap-
pearance of Fall was made by the
defense in the address to the jury.
Such a direct appeal to sympathy
and prejudice justified, according to
the weight of authority, a cautionary
instruction. Portraying the govern-
ment, particularly the Federal gov-
ernment, as a tyrant is an old trick,
and if successful would seriously
hamper law enforcement. In a typ-
ical case, the Federal government
was represented by counsel, in sum-
mation, as a bully who took the
poor citizen out of his protecting
state court, and put him into the
hands of an official eager for a
victim. The court's charges tend-
ing to disabuse the minds of the
jurors, and assuring them that the
Federal court was a people's court,
and that what they were witnessing
was prosecution, not persecution,
was held valid: Kennedy v. United
States (C. C. A. S. C., 1921) 275
Fed. 182. Here we have a strik-
ingly similar situation in the at-
tempt to portray Fall as a victim
of the Senate's political persecution.
The same reasoning determined
the rule as to cautionary instructions
as determined the rule as to charges
containing intimations of probable
clemency. The one effort seems to
be to preserve the purpose and
spirit of trial by jury. A check is
provided in the one case upon the
trial judge, and in the other upon
counsel, with the same objective in
view. The desire in both cases is
that "solely upon the weight or
credibility of the evidence
should the jury decide": Bishop,
supra. The verdict should conform
to the evidence, not to any precon-
ceived notions of justice: People
v. Duzan, supra. In the Miller case,
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there was error in the charge solely
because it introduced extraneous
matter that prevented a verdict from
being reached on the evidence alone:
Miller v. United States, supra. An
excellent expression of the fact that
the criterion in these cases is the
injection of this "new element" is
presented by a case in which a
charge intimating a probability of
clemency was held to be prejudicial
error, notwithstanding the fact that
clemency actually was exercised:
Commonwealth v. Switzer (1890)
134 Pa. 383, 19 A. 181.
The facts of the principal case in
no way put it into the type of situa-
tion against which the system of
trial by jury is being protected.
The instructions merely served to
bring the issue out of the clouds
and into the light; no extraneous
matter was introduced; the portion
of the charge discussing clemency
was purely cautionary, and was
carefully worded; the sole object
was to bring the minds of the jury
to the issue to be tried, rather than
to take their minds away from it.
When a charge does this, it meets
with a very authoritative standard.
See Reynolds v. United States
(1878) 98 U. S. 145, 168.
JEROME L. FELs.
CRIMINAL LAW -NEw TRIAL-
RECANTATION nY STATE'S WITNESS
AS GROUND FOR NEW TRxAL.-[Illi-
nois] The defendant, found guilty
of murder, was sentenced to twenty-
five years in the penitentiary. His
motion for a new trial was based
mainly on an affidavit of one of the
State's witnesses in which she re-
pudiated her testimony given at the
trial. According to the court's state-
ment of fact, when the defendant
and his son were alone in a room
after a quarrel between them, the
son was fatally injured by a re-
volver shot. The defendant claimed
that the deceased attacked him, and
that the defendant's revolver was
accidentally discharged in the strug-
gle. The defendant's daughter had
testified that after the shooting she
asked him why he had done it, and
he replied, "I told .you I would do
that some day, and I am going to
kill hnother one before I die." After
the trial she made an affidavit that
this testimony was false, that she
had neither asked such a question,
nor received such an answer; that
at the time she was fourteen years
old, was unmarried, but pregnant,
and as a result of her condition and
fear of its consequences, she was
terror-stricken to the point of not
knowing what was going on, and
that only since the trial had she be-
gun to remember things clearly.
The court, after weighing her re-
cantation and other evidence point-
ing strongly to the defendant's guilt:
Held, that the judgment be affirmed
on the ground that a recantation by
a witness of testimony on trial does
not necessarily entitle the defendant
to a new trial, and that the affidavit
of this recanting witness is not en-
titled to such weight as to justify a
conclusion that the testimony on
trial was corrupt and wilfully false:
People v. Marquis (II., 1931) 176
N. E. 314.
The rule that recantation by a
witness does not necessarily entitle
the defendant to a new trial, finds
no dissent in any of the cases ex-
amined. It appears that the question
is a matter for the trial court's dis-
cretion. First, it must be determined
what weight is to be attached to the
recantation, and whether it be true
or false. In the words of Chief
Justice Cardozo, "the trial judge
has to choose between recantors as
conscience - stricken penitents, or
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criminal conspirators to defeat the
ends of justice": People v. Shili-
tano (1916) 218 N. Y. 161, 112 N.
E. 733, 739, L. R. A. 1916F 1044.
In evaluating a repudiation, the
court usually will go into the mo-
tives behind it: People v. Giordano
(1919) 106 Misc. Rep. 235, 175 N.
Y. S. 715; People v. Farini (1925)
125 Misc. Rep. 300, 209 N. Y. S.
532. An extensive latitude is per-
mitted the trial judge in this matter.
Where he finds that it was induced
by threats and fear of the defend-
ant's friends, as in the Shilitano
case, supra; or that the affidavit was
not voluntarily made: Martin v.
U. S. (1927) 17 F. (2d) 973; or
that the witness appeared to be
under the p'ersonal influence of the
defendant; Little v. State (1923) 161
Ark. 245, 255 S. W. 892; or the
witness made a vague, self-contra-
dictory impression upon cross-exam-
ination after the repudiation: Peo-
ple v. Van Den Dreissche (1925)
233 Mich. 38, 206 N. W. 339, the
appellate court will sustain the de-
nial of a new trial, even though the
evidence repudiated was vital to the
State's case.
In the second place, as with the
probable effect test for newly-dis-
covered evidence, the trial court ex-
ercises its discretion, subject to re-
view by the Supreme Court for
abuse, in deciding what probable
effect the recantation would have at
the trial, and what influence it
would have had on the jury. Where
there was other evidence to sup-
port a conviction, a court has re-
fused a new trial even though the
defendant presented the affidavit of
six jurors that they would have
rendered a different verdict had they
known of the recanting witness'
perjury: State v. Doyle (1915) 138
La. 350, 70 So. 322; see also U. S.
v. Biena (1895) 8 N. M. 99, 42 P.
70. At variance with these opinions,
which put the determination of what
the jury would have done under
these new circumstances up to the
judge, there is the dissenting opinion
in the unusually difficult Shilitano
case, supra, where it was said,
"what court can speculate upon
what basis the jurors formed a
judgment, upon whose testimony
they based their decision?", and
where the minority thought it would
have been more proper for the trial
judge to have sought the aid of a
jury.
In the exercise of this phase of its
discretion, the court determines
whether the evidence other than the
recanted testimony would be suffi-
cient to warrant a conviction.
Whenever a new trial has been
denied, there was either other con-
clusive evidence, or there were
counter-affidavits reaffirming the or-
iginal testimony, or the recantation
was held unworthy of belief. New
trials have not been granted where
the retraction has served merely to
impeach a witness, or to repudiate
purely cumulative testimony. A
denial of a new trial has been sus-
tained even when the recanting wit-
ness confessed to the crime: Peo-
ple v. Shea (1896) 38 N. Y. 821,
16 Misc. Rep. III, 11 N. Y. C. R.
307. In a rape case where convic-
tion was based almost entirely on
the testimony of the prosecuting
witness, the defendant was unsuc-
cessful in his motion, the court
deeming the repudiation to have
been induced by the close family re-
lationship between the parties: Peo-
ple v. Van Den Dreissche, supra. In
Georgia the decisions are governed
by the Civil Code provision that the
verdict cannot be set aside for re-
cantation, unless the witness shall
have been convicted of perjury as a
result of his testimony, and the
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verdict could not have been obtained
without his evidence.
Where the defendant's motion has
been successful, it has been because
the disavowal was believed by the
court, and the testimony repudiated
was essential to a finding of guilty:
Chappell v. State (1911) 6 Ok. Cr.
398, 119 P. 139; Carter v. State
(1914) 75 Tex. Cr. R. 110, 170 S. W.
739; People v. Busch (1923) 228
Ill. App. 11; People v. Cohen (1921)
117 Misc. Rep. 158, 191 N. Y. S.
831 (a statute prohibited a convic-
tion on an accomplice's uncorrobo-
rated testimony, and the corroborat-
ing witness recanted). Where there
is strong unretracted evidence on
which to base a conviction, there
may be granted a new trial based on
other material, though otherwise in-
sufficient, errors if in addition there
is a recantation: Myers v. State
(1914) 111 Ark. 399, 163 S. W.
1177; Clark v. State (1891) 29 Tex.
App. 437, 16 S. W. 171.
Behind the courts' refusals to grant
these motions except under unusual
conditions is a realization of the
ease with which improper influences
can be brought to bear after the
trial on the witnesses in criminal
cases. There may be only too much
pressure exerted upon them by the
associates of powerful defendants
before and during the trial, and un-
less the courts are stem, it would
be in rare cases that some im-
portant witness, so often of a ques-
tionable character himself, could not
be frightened or bribed into insisting
that he had perjured himself, to say
nothing of prearranging a situation
dependent upon an easily swayed
court. If granting the new trial
were relatively automatic, the situa-
tion would be one where-"the power
to grant a convicted defendant a
new trial rests not with the court,
but with the witnesses who testified
against him at the trial": People
v. Shilitano, supra. This result is
prevented by making the success of
the defendant's motion depend upon
a stringent inspection by the court
of the circumstances of the case and
of the recantation. Only in an un-
usual case, where the basis of con-
viction is destroyed by a repudia-
tion accepted as truthful, shohld a
new trial be granted, and only in an
unusual one would justice seem to
require one.
C. D. HARVEY.
